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Do Semantic Aspects of Music Have a Notation?
According to many scholars and philosophers, music is not the same thing as the sounds
and notes but only manifests through them. Some scholars think that the real music lies in
its values, ideas, noemas, which are transcendental in relation to empirical sound realities.
However, the extent to which the purely human side of music, its ›modalities‹ – in the
philosophical and semiotic sense – can find their equivalent sign-vehicles, and the impor-
tance of their fixation into concrete visual or other signs in the music history is an ever
changing variable. The relativity of notation was noted early by François Couperin when
he said: »Nous écrivons différemment de ce que nous exécutons«1. Later Charles Seeger
spoke about prescriptive and descriptive notation.2 When conductor Serge Koussevitzky
was dissatisfied with a musician’s performance and he asked which note was wrong, the
maestro answered: »no, it is b e t we e n the notes«.3 Hence notes, the notation does not
say all about music and what makes it music in the end.
The ›modalities‹ have been an essential component of the generative models of musical
semiotics. In language they appear through verbs such as ›to be‹, ›to do‹, ›want‹, ›can‹,
›must‹, ›know‹ and ›believe‹. Applied to music, they have been described by a notation
system stemming from modal logic and Greimas’ semiotic system.4 However, the sym-
bols of formal logic are not quite apt to portray this type of living and processual mu-
sical semantics devoid of any concrete ›meanings‹. Firstly, they are difficult to grasp for
a non-specialist, and secondly, music cannot be entirely digitalized into discrete units of
notations, because it is a continuous process. Music is a constant transformation from pre-
signs into act-signs and from act-signs into post-signs. Other such new sign categories –
discovered by the existential semiotics5 – are endo-signs and exo-signs, pheno-signs and
geno-signs, quasi-signs or as-if-signs, and trans-signs. Music consists in a continuous dia-
lectic among them. It is thus a constant flux between transcendence and ›Dasein‹.
How could music be analyzed and the results notated in the light of this fundamental
view of its significative and communicative nature? Certainly this level could be described,
but could it ever be ›prescribed‹ in the sense that musicians would understand it and take it
into account in their renderings? My hypothesis is that a new notation can be found in order
to reveal and communicate this essential aspect of music. This could happen by combining
the Greimasian-based formal grammars of modalities and the theoretical ideas of Heinrich
Schenker. That would be the next step in the elaboration of theories in musical semiotics.
1 See Jean-Claude Veilhan, Les Règles de l’interprétation musicale à l’époque baroque (XVIIe–XVIIIe s.)
générales à tous les instruments, Paris 1977, p. iii.
2 See Charles Seeger, »On the Moods of a Music Logic«, in: JAMS 13 (1960), p. 224–261.
3 See Nicolas Slonimsky, Perfect Pitch: A Life Story, Oxford and New York 1988, p. 31.
4 See Eero Tarasti, A Theory of Musical Semiotics, Bloomington 1994.
5 See ibid., Existential Semiotics, Bloomington 2000.
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At first glance one would think of musical notation to be the primary object of such a
discipline as semiotics when it is applied to music. However, it is amazing how few schol-
ars have addressed notation in this field. The late Ingmar Bengtsson in his panoramic
study Musikvetenskap6 had some ideas on it. But regardless of the Gregorian semiology, the
term ›semiotics‹ appears seldomly in specialized studies of the field. The medievalist Leo
Treitler has written a lot on this topic in his recent study With Voice and Pen7, in his attempt
to relate theories of general semiotics to notational problems of musical discourse and its
history in the Middle Ages. So a historically-oriented musicologist certainly would see
our problem as a variable of historical contexts, and if we accept the principle of Treitler8
that we always write history from the point of view of our own time, we would think that
since we are living in the age of semiotics, this is only another new interpretation in a
series of diverse paradigms and scientific contexts of our musical studies. In fact, some ex-
amples by Treitler display interesting aspects of medieval notation, like the score in the
form of heart and using red and black colours to notify time values of performance. On
the one hand, the ›Gestalt‹ here is an iconic sign of the contents of the song whereas the
colours indicate what we called modalities above – in the linguistic and philosophical, not
the musical sense – influence the time values of performance.
Yet, our title contains another item which is at least as problematic, namely ›semantics‹.
Semantics has been often confused with semiotics. The latter is of course the umbrella title
covering the meanings, semantics as one of its subfields, whereas the study of significance
i. e. semiotics, also concerns those signs which carry meanings or what we call ›sign vehi-
cles‹9. Semiotics is often considered a combination of significance and communication. This
poses a very simple question: how does musical semantics differ from verbal semantics? In
spoken and written language, where we have a ›word‹ as the basic semantic unit, we do not
often need to ask what it means. No special sign or notation is needed to semantics on the
side of syntax. When we read or hear a verbal sign, we automatically associate its meaning
by convention and by using codes of grammar. If there is a problem, i. e. we do not directly
understand what it is, we use a dictionary or use other words to clarify the situation.
In music this is much more complicated. Musical signs of notation refer first to perfor-
mance instructions and aural manifestation. This of course passes through mediation of ges-
tural language, i. e. the notation is first rendered via tactile signs or ›gSigns‹, to use Thomas
A. Sebeok’s formulation.10 Only thereafter we think further what this sound form or ›Ge-
stalt‹ might mean. Some scholars say that those »tönend bewegte Formen« do not mean any-
thing and so they stop the discussion there. To their mind music is only a »Form im Spiel
der Empfindungen« as Immanuel Kant put it, or mere design (David Lidov11), or what is
called ›absolute Music‹, totally abstract. Such a formalist attitude is considered a totally le-
6 Ingmar Bengtsson, Musikvetenskap: En översikt, Stockholm ²1977.
7 Leo Treitler, With Voice and Pen: Coming to Know Medieval Song and How it Was Made, Oxford 2003.
8 Oral communication with the author.
9 Winfrid Nöth, Handbuch der Semiotik, Stuttgart and Weimar ²2000.
10 See for example Thomas A. Sebeok, Global Semiotics, Bloomington and Indianapolis 2001.
11 See David Lidov, Is Language a Music? Writings on Musical Form and Signification, Bloomington and
Indianapolis 2005.
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gitimate aesthetic standpoint from Eduard Hanslick to Igor Stravinskij and Claude Lévi-
Strauss.12 There is no meaning, no semantics in music, we only add it there later for various
reasons which may be a social habit (contextual theories), due to the fact that all music is
communication (as the mediating theories of music argue, exemplified by Antoine Hen-
nion13), because music evokes other artistic texts or events in its external world (intertextual
and programmatic tendencies) or because music is one of our subject strategies by which we
orient ourselves within our deep psychic lie (psychoanalytic theories). Some adopt a more
moderate view that music does not convey meanings but only expresses something which
is meaningful.14 At the same time we come close to the problem of representation. It is the
strongest relationship between a sign – in music notation – and something to which it refers
(renvoi by Roman Jakobson15). Nelson Goodman has pondered the ontological status of the
score in his study Languages of Art16, where he claims that musical performance is an ›exem-
plification‹ of the score, calling this relationship type / token (borrowed from Peirce) as
well. Another approach to this problem in the Anglo-analytic tradition has been made by
the Finnish musicologist Kari Kurkela in his workNote and Tone: A Semantic Analysis of Con-
ventional Music Notation17 which applies Montague’s semantic theory to music. Moreover the
issue can be scrutinized from the viewpoint of computer – assisted studies such as those by
Kai Lassfolk in his Music Notation as Objects: An Object-Oriented Analysis of the Common Wes-
tern Music Notation System.18 However, we have to remember that we have ›less‹ strong mea-
ningful devices such as to signify, to express, to convey etc. concerning representation.
In spite of all these sophisticated musical theories, we should take into account one gen-
eral truth revealed by general semiotics concerning all sign systems and symbolic forms
invented by a man/woman. Namely that something which does no t have a meaning can
appear only as a negative side of its primary meaningfulness. This was noticed as early as
1976 by one of the Tartu school scholars, Boris Gasparow.19 This means that although mu-
sic is an ›absolute‹ and ›abstract‹ form it is always a symbolic form and even when negating
any overt and explicit meanings, it contains something of it, even if it is only a Hegelian
negation through a kind of ›negative Dialektik‹. The problem of this paper is how such
meaningfulness is approached and how that which is implicitly semantic in every, even ti-
niest musical utterance can be made audible, visible and ultimately explicit by some kind
12 »La Musique, c’est le langage moins sens«. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques IV: L’Homme nu, Paris
1971, p. 579.
13 Antoine Hennion, »Institution et marché: Représentations musicales, à propos d’une audition de
variétés«, in: Musique et Médiations, le métier, l’instrument, l’oreille, ed. by Hugues Dufourt and Joël-Marie
Fauquet, Paris 1994, p. 147–163.
14 See Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, London 1997.
15 See Roman Jakobson, Essais de linguistique générale, Paris 1963.
16 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976.
17 Kari Kurkela, Note and Tone: A Semantic Analysis of Conventional Music Notation (= Acta Musicologica
Fennica 15), Helsinki 1986.
18 Kai Lassfolk, Music Notation as Objects: An Object-Oriented Analysis of the Common Western Music Nota-
tion System (= Acta Semiotica Fennica 19), Imatra 2004.
19 Boris Gasparow, »Some Descriptive Problems of Musical Semantics«, in: Dispositio. Revista Hispánica
de Semiótica Literaria (1976), p. 247–262.
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of notation. Some scholars such as Algirdas Julien Greimas in general semiotics speak of
›structural semantics‹20 and some, such as Leonard B. Meyer, of »embodied meanings«.21
Does our conventional musical and prescriptive notation contain anything of this im-
plicit or hidden semantic aspect of music? Have methods of analysis developed by music
semioticians been able to find an appropriate notation and visualization for it? In order
to answer these questions we have to make a short overview of the history of musical
semiotics and its analytic procedures to find out whether there is anything like ›seman-
tic analysis‹ or descriptive notation of musical semantics. Of course, such an overview
cannot be given without simultaneously questioning what the epistemic foundations of
each scholar about the nature of such implicit semantics are. Is it anything which can be
grasped by verbal reactions to music, when we suppose we can only try to find a successful
verbal meta-language to such entities? This would be the same as Nattiez’ Aisthesis view-
point or ›Rezeptionsgeschichte‹ of musical works. We look at traces of musical meanings
as experienced by listeners and their verbal commentaries as the ultimate form of musical
hermeneutics of, for example, Arnold Schering’s romanticism. Or is it something of which
we become aware when dealing with either verbal or notational indications of perform-
ance by composers: when Robert Schumann writes »rasch« (studied by Roland Barthes22)
or »durchaus phantastisch und leidenschaftlich« or when such conventional signs as cres-
cendo, diminuendo, sf, pedal etc. are used? In these cases musical semantics would be some-
thing like the aspectual semes in verbal language: i. e. grammar forms which determine
whether something is said sufficiently, insufficiently, too early, too late, with certainty, un-
certainty, with hesitation etc. Ultimately we have to admit that without such aspects music
would not be music but rather something lifeless – although again some periods such as
ours, with its passion for ›Urtext‹, deny the relevance of this level. Moreover we have to
admit that the ›isotopes‹, i. e. deepest semantic categories, are decisive for what communi-
cative devices a composer /performer / listener applies. For instance, in a piece like Robert
Schumann’s Phantasy in C major, he uses isotopies which allow us to grasp the musical
surface and ›notes‹ in a semantically correct manner. I have always been convinced that
the music in its last movement »Langsam getragen, Durchweg leise zu halten« evokes the
end scene of Goethe’s Faust II through its temporal, actorial and spatial disengagements.
This is a musician’s and a semiotician’s intuition. But how can we prove and justify it on
the basis of the notation, i. e. by interpreting what the composer wrote down in notes? We
must go far beyond the concrete visible signs of the score to legitimize such a reasoning.
Ultimately, it is possible only if we are competent in the ›isotopies‹ of romantic culture and
its intertextual field or what Umberto Eco called »encyclopedia of culture«.23
So if we address the question whether musical semantics has a notation we move in
these lines, and try to grasp what Ernst Kurth understood by his idea that music is kinetic
energy. Something similar was later stated by L.B. Meyer when he said that music is basi-
20 See Algirdas Julien Greimas, Sémantique structurale, Paris 1966.
21 Leonard B. Meyer, Explaining Music, Chicago 1973.
22 See Eero Tarasti, »Roland Barthes or the Birth of Semiotics from the Spirit of Music«, in: Con Roland
Barthes alle sorgenti del senso, ed. byAugusto Ponzio, PatriziaCalefato and SusanPetrilli, Rome 2006, p. 187–198.
23 Umberto Eco, Kant et l’ornithorynque, Paris 1999.
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cally implication. These ideas would preclude that musical semantics is essentially of tem-
poral nature, i. e. very much in line with Heidegger’s sense. Yet Meyer thought that the
archetypal cognitive ›Gestalten‹ of music, such as axis, symmetry, scale, triad and so on
lie behind the implication.24 From an energetic point of view, these ›Gestalten‹ are not the
primary thing, they are rather chosen by a composer when he wants to express a certain
type of kinetic energy and its unfolding. Altogether, we see here how musical semantics is
irrefutably connected with postulates on the epistemic nature of music itself.
To refer to my own recent theories on existential semiotics, I would argue that music is
a kind of ›Schein‹ (in the sense of Kant, Schiller and Adorno), in the sense that something
immanent, ›semantic‹ manifests in every musical utterance, vertically. But at the same time
music is a horizontal, linear and syntagmatic appearance, i. e. essentially processual and dy-
namics – just like Kurth thought. I have already underlined the importance of Kurth’s view
on music and its essence in A Theory of Musical Semiotics.25 We also know how crucial Kurth
was to Heinrich Schenker. But now if we accept that music is ›Erscheinung‹, namely ›hori-
zontal appearance‹, we reach a very profound epistemic level to build an entirely new theory
of musical semiotics. This should also include a new type of notation of such ›appearance‹.
My earlier solution was to use symbols borrowed from formal logics, the same ones
which Greimas used in his extremely formalized analytic meta-language. I refer for instance
to my study of Chopin’s G minor Ballade in which such formalized procedure reaches its
culmination.26 I still think this is possible, but in a pragmatic sense it is not yet fully real-
izing the potential of modal aspect of music, i. e. modalities (›to be‹, ›to do‹, ›will‹, ›can‹,
›know‹, ›must‹, ›believe‹). Neither is it very comprehensible for musicians without educa-
tion in formal logics. Therefore, I strongly believe that Schenkerian notation could be deve-
loped in that direction. Its advantage is that it portrays music as a temporal unfolding, i. e.
appearance, and second, every musical event can be shown its place in the whole process.
Tom Pankhurst has already proposed that Schenkerian ›Stufen 3-2-1‹ could be equalled
to Greimassian modalities like ›want to do‹, ›be‹ etc.27 This idea could now be elaborated
further by studying the ›existential‹ moments of musical work, i. e. moments in which the
necessity of Schenkerian generative course – and the freedom of choice which a composer
always has within the limits of the grammar – meet each other. Many leading Schenkerians
like Eduard Laufer admit that this method would also need such kind of semantic aspect in
order to legitimize its meaningfulness in the musical process. This would enable us to inter-
pret music as an existential and even transcendental phenomenon.28 But it would also bring
this idea quite concretely into the practice of musical analysis and its rigorous notation.
24 Meyer, Explaining Music.
25 Tarasti, A Theory of Musical Semiotics, p. 98–106.
26 See ibid., p. 154 –180.
27 Tom Pankhurst, Desiring Closure, Yearning for Freedom: A Semiotic Study of Tonality in Three Symphonies
by Carl Nielsen, PhD Diss. University of Manchester 2004, p. 61– 65.
28 See Eero Tarasti, »Existential and Transcendental Analysis of Music« in: Studi Musicali 34 (2/ 2005),
p. 223–265. See also other works of the author on this topic: Signs of Music, Berlin 2002; Mythe et musique,
Paris 2003; and Eero Tarasti (ed.), Semiotique existentielle (= Revue de Synthèse à Orientation Sémio-
logique 116), Paris 2003.
